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RECENT CASES
court must follow the statute of limitations of the state in which it is
sitting. "A right which can be enforced no longer by an action at law
is shorn of its most valuable attribute."21 This manifestation of the
substantive nature of such statutes is also supported by other statute
of limitations problems. For example, where a statute creates a right
which was not existent at common law and also limits the life of that
right, the lcx fori does not control.22 It is said that the condition is
attached to and follows the right.23 Some cases have even permitted
lex loci control although the limitation upon the statutory right is con-
tained only in a general statute rather than in a creating statute.24
Furthermore, the extension of statutes of limitation will not revive a
right, dead under the old statute.25 Such also indicates that a statute
of limitations affects more than the remedy.
Regardless of the possible contentions about the substantive nature
of such statutes, the plain meaning of the language used in this
statute, the construction of the parallel statute, and the vast majority
of contra decisions in other jurisdictions seem to indicate the need
for a new construction of the Kentucky statute in line with the majority
rule. The adoption by the Legislature of new words presents an op-
portunity for the court to rest a new holding upon authority, in order
to overcome the strength of stare decisis.
CHRL~u~s lqicELAm DOYLE
DEGREES OF NEGIaGENCE-NEGLIGENCE PER SE-ExcUSED VIOLATIoNS OF
On n NcE-Blackwell's administrator brought an action against the
Union Light, Heat and Power Co. for wrongful death caused by negli-
gence. The defendant's high tension wires, carrying 13,500 volts, ex-
tended across one end of a vacant lot where Blackwell was helping
the operator of a crane. Blackwell was electrocuted while attempting
to attach the cable of the crane to a bucket directly beneath the wires.
The wires were uninsulated, thus violating an 1896 ordinance of the
city of Newport which required all conducting wires except those for
electric railways to be covered with durable weatherproof insulation
of not less than two coatings. Held: Judgment for defendant was
' 28 YALE L.J. 492, 496 (1919).
- Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953); Order of Travelers
v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947); Maki v. George R. Cooke, supra note 1; Wilson v.
Massengill, 124 F. 2d 666 (6th Cir. 1942); 9 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 723, 726 (1942).
=9 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 723, 726 (1942).
Maki v. George R. Cooke, supra note 1, Contra: McDaniel v. Mulvihill, 263
S.W. 2d 759 (Tenn. 1953).
' Supra note 23, at 725.
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reversed on appeal. Blackwelrs Adrr v. Union Light, Heat and Power
Co., 265 S.W. 2d 462 (Ky. 1953).
There are two importan* principles in this case:
1. Those who mairt.,±a high voltage electric lines have a duty "to
use the utmost care and skill" in doing so.
2. Where the violation of an ordinance may be "explained or
excused" the negligence per se rule does not apply.
In holding that all who maintain a high voltage electric line have a
duty "to use the utmost care and skill to assure the safety of persons
who may reasonably be expected to come in contact with their wires,"'-
the court's ruling was in accord with authority in this state.2 The court
then went a step further and defined "utmost care" to mean "the high-
est degree of care, and conversely, highest degree of care means the
utmost care and skill."3
Although this principle of imposing the highest degree of care on
a supplier of electricity has long been recognized in this state,4 it is not
majority law today.5 Certainly, it has been severely criticized by
authorities in the tort field.6 Prosser states that "there are no degrees
of care, as a matter of law; there are only different amounts of care,
as a matter of fact," and that the recognition of such degrees "adds
nothing but confusion to the already nebulous and uncertain standards
which must be given to the jury."7 A preferable approach would be to
recognize only one degree of care, that of ordinary care under the
'Blackwell's Adm'r v. Union Light, Heat and Power Co., 265 S.W. 2d 462,
464 (Ky. 1953).'Green River Elec. Co-op. Corp. v. Blandford, 306 Ky. 125, 206 S.W. 2d
475 (1947); Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Young's Adm'r, 141 Ky. 805, 133
S.W. 991 (1911).
'Supra note 1, at 464.
'Mangan's Adm'r v. Louisville Elec. Light Co., 122 Ky. 476, 91 S.W. 703
(1906).
'PRossER, TORTS 256 (1941).
'PRossER, ToRTs 256 (1941); Feezer, Tort Liability of Suppliers of Electricity,
22 WAsH. U.L.Q. 857, 360 (1937); RESTATEmrNT, TORTS sec. 282, 283 (1934)
only recognizes the standard of conduct of a reasonable man under the circum-
stances. See also, Molius, TORTS 58 (1953) referring to degrees of care in in-
structions in cases involving infirm, children, or carriers.
PRossER, TORTS 258, 259 (1941). Also see, Hanna v. Central States Elec.
Co., 210 Iowa 864, 232 N.W. 421, 429 (1931), where the Iowa court held the
transmission company to reasonable care under the circumstances and stated,
"Negligence and care are no longer classified in this state as to degrees." Steam-
boat New World v. King, 16 How. 469, 474, 114 L. Ed. 1019 (1853) also stated;
"The theory that there are three degrees of negligence, described by the terms
slight, ordinary, and gross, has been introduced into the common law from some
of the commentators on the Roman Law. It may be doubted if these terms can be
usefully applied in practice. Their meaning is not fixed or cppable of being so.
Indeed, what is common or ordinary diligence is more a .natter of fact thanlaw. .. "
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circumstances, rather than to allow varying degrees of care for dif-
ferent types or classes of defendants. .One of the circumstances to be
considered would be the hazard and the vpparent risk involved, as in
this case of maintaining high voltage lines. This has the advantage of
clarity and simplicity since there would b6 need for a departure
from the usual formula.
The other important question concerned the extent to which the
violation of an ordinance may be "explained or excused" in order to
avoid the application of the negligence per se rule.s This jurisdiction
has recognized that the violation of a statute or ordinance is considered
negligence per se if the negligence was the proximate cause of the
injury. However, the instant decision projected an additional principle
into Kentucky law on negligence-the possibility that the violation of
criminal legislation will not result in civil liability. The court stated:
Some courts have considered that they have no alternative but to
treat the violation of such acts as negligence, while others have
recognized that there is no compulsion by which a purely criminal.
statute must lead to civil liability. Although there is no direct
authority on the subject in Kentucky, we think the better rule would
require that in the determination of its civil liability the appellee
should be required to insulate only in the event that it, may do so
safely and effectively. 9
Earlier cases relieved the violator of liability either by stating that the
violation was not the proximate cause of the injury'0 or by interpreta-
tion of the legislation." However, in this case there was no problem of
proximate cause, nor would the court allow evidence interpreting the
ordinance because it was "plain and unambiguous on its face."
12
Although there is a lack of authority in Kentucky law, many other
jurisdictions have recognized the possibility of an excused violation.
As usually stated, a violation may be excused if it resulted from causes
or things beyond the control of the person charged,'3 or where the
violation was reasonable under the circumstances, and the statute or
ordinance did not express a universally obligatory rule of conduct.
It is important to note that in some cases the courts have not
allowed the violation to be excused even though due care was used
since the cause was within the control of the violator. For example, the
'For a thorough discussion of Negligence Per Se in Kentucky see 88 Ky. L.J.
479 (1950). ' Supra note 1, at 465.
' Greyhound Terminal of Louisville, Inc. v. Thomas, 307 Ky. 44, 209 S.W.
2d478 (1948).
n Injuries must have. been such as statute, ordinance, or regulation was in-
tended to prevent",Phoenix Amusement Co. v. White, 806 Ky. 361, 208 S.W. 2d
64 (1948). U, ' Supra note 1, at 466.
65 C.J.S. 426 (1950); 45 C.J. 731 (1946).
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deliberate burning of grass and weeds in violation of an ordinance
was conclusively proven to be negligence, even though more than
ordinary precaution was being used.14 The Kentucky court did not
mention any such limitation but made the ruling turn on the safety or
effectiveness of complying with the ordinance.
Tedla v. Ellman15 is perhaps the leading case regarding a violation
reasonable under the circumstances. In that case the plaintiffs were
struck by the defendant's auto while wheeling a baby carriage on the
right side of the highway in violation of a statute which specifically
provided that pedestrians should keep to the left side. Considering
the fact that there was "very heavy Sunday night traffic" going west,
the court held that this was an excused violation of the statute and
adopted the language of section 286 of the Restatement of Torts in
stating:
Many statutes and ordinances are so worded as apparently to express
a universally obligatory rule of conduct. Such enactments, however,
may in view of their purpose and spirit be properly construed as
intended to apply only to ordinary situations and to be subject to the
qualification that the conduct prohibited thereby is not wrongful if,
because of an emergency or the like, the circumstances justify an
apparent disobedience to the letter of the enactment .... lo
Excused violations of legislation recognized in other jurisdictions
include such acts as blocking of a street by a train for a longer period
than the ordinance allowed in order to repair the locomotive's brake
rigging,' 7 driving on the highway after sundown without a tail-light
in violation of statute while the owner was using his best efforts to
obtain garage service,' 8 or driving on the left side of the road when
the right lane was blocked.'1 In some instances, such as approaching
a known railroad track with lights dimmed as required by ordinance,
it may be negligence to obey the legislation at all.
20
Other valid reasons have been given for excusing violations of
criminal legislation. The Kentucky Court of Appeals stated that it
took judicial notice of the fact that there is a "deplorable array of
trivial, obsolete, and entirely unreasonable legislation". 2' The applica-
tion of standards of conduct defined by obsolete legislation such as a
' Gallichotte v. Calif. Mut. Building & Loan Ass'n, 4 Calif. A. 2d 503, 41
P. 2d 349 (1935).
Tedla v. Ellman, 280 N.Y. 125, 19 N.E. 2d 987 (1939).
'6 Supra note 15, at 991.
Walker v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 95 Kan. 702, 149 P. 677 (1915).
'8 Taber v. Smith, 26 S.W. 2d 722 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
Conder v. Griffity, 61 Ind. App. 218, 111 N.E. 816 (1916).
Phillips v. Davis, 3 F. 2d 798 (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1925).2 t Supra note 1, at 465.
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six miles per hour speed limit 22 could impose unreasonable civil
liability. As it has been aptly stated, "Draconian application of the
doctrine of negligence per se will occasionally result in a finding that
a defendant who was careful in fact was negligent in law."2 3 Another
reason for allowing excused violations is that a blind application of
the negligence per se rule may result in liability without fault. There
are "cases in which the defendant is not deserving of admonition, nor
in a better position to bear or distribute the loss than the plaintiff."2 4
The principal case establishes that a supplier of electricity must
use the highest degree of care in doing so, and that one who violates
an ordinance may be excused of civil liability depending upon the
safety, practicability, or effectiveness of complying with its terms. The
latter represents an excellent development in the law of negligence per
se because (1) the cause of the injury may be outside the control of
the violator, (2) the violator may be acting reasonably under the cir-
cumstances, (3) the legislation may not be such as to impose a
universally obligatory rule of conduct, (4) the amount of unreasonable
legislation in existence, (5) a strict application of the negligence per
se rule may result in .liability without fault.
WAYNE J. CA~mOLL
WLLs-INvAIDrrY OF ENT=e WIL WBME A PORTION VIOLATES TI
RuLE AGAmIsT PERPETurnEs-LAcEs-In 1930 testatrix devised her real
estate to her four children for life, remainder to her surviving grand-
children for life, remainder in fee to her great-grandchildren. The
possessory life tenants were given expressly the power to sell the land
in fee provided the proceeds were reinvested in other land and the title
to the new land taken in strict accordance with the terms of the will.
Each of the children exercised the power of sale and in a single deed
conveyed to their father in fee the land devised in the will. He in turn
executed a separate deed of reinvestment and partition back to each
of the children. These deeds from the father to the children included
not only the land devised by the testatrix to the children, but also all
of the land which the father owned in his own name. In other words,
each child received a separate tract of the family lands by way of
reinvestment. The deed to the appellee reserved a life estate in tho
father, and then created a remainder for life in appellee, with the
L. & N. R.R. Co. v. Dalton, 102 Ky. 290, 43 S.W. 431 (1897).
Moiuus, TORTS 65 (1958).
Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Civil Liability, 46 HAav. L.
REv. 453 at 458 (1983).
